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This paper examines the relationship between mortgage default decisions and
relevant observable variables under the light of a random utility model. The focus
of the study is the Colombian mortgage market between 1997 and 2004 using two
separate data sets that are matched using simulation techniques. The estimation
allows the computation of mortgage default probabilities that are directly related
to an underlying model of optimal default. Results are sharp and indicate that
variation in current income has little eﬀect on mortgage default, compared to
housing prices and mortgage balances.
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During the late 1990’s the Colombian economy, similarly to several other emerging
economies, experienced a severe ﬁnancial crisis and economic slowdown. The eﬀects of
such crisis were fuelled by a dramatic increase in the default rates of mortgage holders,
leading to the collapse of several major ﬁnancial institutions and a major crisis that
persisted for years after the end of the crisis. The behavior of debtors was aﬀected
by several separate factors: on one hand, incomes fell, making it diﬃcult for many
households to fulﬁll their payment obligations; on the other hand, debt balances which
were tied to a market interest rate increased as the monetary authority stepped in to
contain the exchange rate. Simultaneously, and as the crisis ensued, the prices of real
estate, which had risen to unprecedented levels since the mid 1990’s, fell dramatically.
The estimated cumulative cost of the crisis is above 10% of GDP.
The speciﬁc objective of this paper is to evaluate the relationship between individual
default and other observable variables under the light of a simple structural model. The
estimates can the be used to evaluate counterfactual equilibria under the assumptions
of the model. The estimates can also be related to a more general dynamic default
model.
Under given assumptions, this general model nests simpler models that can be
estimated using variations of standard discrete choice models. It can be shown, for
example, that the standard logit and probit models correspond to restricted versions
of the model that ignore unobserved correlated shocks and cannot incorporate non-
matching survey information. This paper presents estimations of default probabilities
using two variations of the logit model that account for unobserved correlated state
variables and for the variation of income as measured in household surveys.
Even though some of the factors mentioned above, such as the interest rate, are
relatively exogenous in the sense that they were regulated by the economic authority,
they are the result of a complicated macroeconomic equilibrium, whose understanding
2is beyond the scope of this work. This is therefore a partial equilibrium analysis, in the
sense that it doesn’t incorporate the higher order eﬀects of economic policy and default
behavior on the economic activity, but is nevertheless a very useful benchmark for
understanding the short-run mechanics of the crisis and provides a formal framework to
a discussion that is not only relevant in Colombia but also in other emerging economies.
The empirical literature on mortgage default is dominated by variations of duration
models as in Deng et al (2002). The advantage of duration models over empirical
models based on individual likelihood functions is that they can be estimated even if
the default rates are very low. On the other hand, the estimated parameters obtained
from a duration model have no clear connection to a behavioral model, much less a
dynamic behavioral model. Therefore, its use as a tool for counterfactual analysis is
limited.
The structural methodology proposed in this paper provides estimates of the under-
lying behavioral model, so that counterfactual experiments are conceptually clearer. In
a manner that is consistent with the existing literature based on duration models, the
model on which the estimation is based is static, in the sense that no attempt is made
to solve the dynamic problem of debtors. In contrast to standard duration models, it
will be clear from the model what the implications of the assumptions are.
The application is based on a data set that contains the basic characteristics and
payment histories of more than 15000 mortgages that were outstanding between 1998
and 2004. The estimation of the model based on individual likelihood functions is
feasible, thanks to the very high rates of default observed during the late 1990’s.
An additional diﬃculty of the empirical exercise lies on the fact that no matching
information is available on the income histories of debtors in the data set. Therefore,
a secondary data set obtained from household survey that matches housing payments
and the value of real estate is used to compute the default probabilities from simulated
draws of income.
3The estimation of the model yields default probabilities with highly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients. The results indicate that short- term income variation has signiﬁcant but
very small impact on default. Default is mostly aﬀected by the variation of housing
prices and of mortgage balances. The implications of this conclusion are discussed at
the end of the paper.
The sharp separate identiﬁcation of the structural parameters relies partly on some
singular institutional features of the Colombian mortgage market during the time span
of the sample. First, the terms of the individual mortgages didn’t use to be negotiated
between debtors and ﬁnancial institutions. In general, mortgage terms were negotiated
between developers or construction companies and the mortgage banks, and the terms
of the mortgage were transferred to any house buyers, who qualiﬁed according to a
simple income rule. Second, while mortgage payments were based on a ﬁxed rate on
the balance of the loan, this balance was indexed to the market interest rates according
to a formula that was determined by the Central Bank1. Therefore, the data contains
enough exogenous variation to identify a detailed structural model.
The next two sections describe the Colombian mortgage market and the general
formal framework. The later section discusses the data, the speciﬁcs of the empirical
model and the results of the empirical exercise.
2 The macroeconomic environment
As indicated above, the collapse of the mortgage market was part of a larger macroeco-
nomic crisis that hit Colombia during the late 1990’s. In this section we illustrate three
macroeconomic features of this crisis that were arguably interrelated: the evolution of
1Speciﬁcally, payments were made according to a ﬁxed rate over the balance of the loan. But then
the balance of the loan increased month by month according to a rate ﬁxed by the Central Bank; it
used to be that this rate of increase was tied to the rate of inﬂation but since the early 1990’s it was
tied to a market interest rate. In any case, the rate was set somewhat arbitrarily by the Central Bank.
4GDP, interest rates, asset prices and the exchange rate.
Figure 1 shows the drastic decrease of GDP during 1998-1999 and the low rate of
growth after the crisis. Simultaneously, the interest rate increased dramatically: ﬁgure
2 displays the annualized overnight interest rate charged by banks, which reached levels
above 40% in 1998. As the model will illustrate, the sudden and dramatic rise of the
interest rates was associated with an equally dramatic worsening of the quality of
banks’ assets due to increased default. Many banks became insolvent and had to be
intervened by the government
The collapse of the market and the fall of households’ income was accompanied by
a decrease in the value of homes. During the ﬁrst years of the decade, the elimination
of ﬁnancial restrictions allowed a rapid growth of home prices. This caused a bubble
that took prices far away from its long run values. The evolution of housing prices
before, during and after the crisis is clear in ﬁgure 32.
Finally it is important to highlight the relationship of the conditions in the mortgage
market with the evolution of foreign exchange market, even though they didn’t aﬀect
directly the Colombian households. The ﬁnancial crisis was in fact triggered by a
massive run on the Colombian peso by international investors that forced the Central
Bank to ﬁrst increase interest rates to defend the exchange rate. Once the exchange
rate was allowed to ﬂoat, it depreciated dramatically as illustrated in ﬁgure 4.
The correlation of the diﬃculties faced by the mortgage market and other macro-
economic variables is evident. The model below will illustrate and quantify the causal
linkages between the diﬀerent factors at the household-level using an economic model.
2Home price indices were estimated by Escobar et al. (2006)
53 A behavioral model of mortgage default and the
estimation strategy
The model below is to be implemented with data from the Colombian mortgage market
between 1997 and 2004. The most salient features of the Colombian mortgage ﬁnancing
system in those days was that all mortgages had variable rates tied to a regulated
interest rate determined by the Central Bank with a formula that was tied to the market
deposit rate. Therefore, reﬁnancing was not an easy option for mortgage holders. The
(total or partial) prepayment option will be ignored, as prepayments did not seem to
be empirically signiﬁcant (relative to defaulting) during the time-span of the sample
and have less social implications than default3.
We will study the behavior of mortgage holders (“debtors”) who live in the mort-
gaged piece of real estate (“home”). The utility that a debtor i gets from the home
depends on a measure xi of subjective home quality. It also depends on the diﬀer-
ence between household income and mortgage payments Yit −Rit and an idiosyncratic
preference shock εit which incorporates unobserved (to the econometrician) variables
that aﬀect default, e.g. home attributes that are only valued by its owner and other
preference shocks that vary across consumers and time. The estimation of the model
is ultimately based on the properties of these unobserved variables.
A debtor will choose to default on her mortgage if the utility of making the mortgage
payments and staying in her home is lower than the utility generated by not making
the loan payment at the time. This alternative, which we will broadly call “default”,
gives rise to a complex scenario. Speciﬁcally, the individual may just be waiting to see
whether the following period she can pay back her dues; she may try to sell the home
and cash the diﬀerence between price and loan balance; she may return it to the bank
3From the perspective of the lending institutions, prepayments are quite relevant. The discussed
methodological framework can incorporate prepayments easily.
6to cover her obligation; ﬁnally, she could also just stop making payments indeﬁnitely
and face forfeiture or a renegotiation with the bank. Given the complexity of this
alternative (which may also lead to moral or reputational costs), we will use a reduced
form for its associated payoﬀ.
Let Vit be the value for a debtor of not defaulting on her loan at time t. For debtor
i we can write the value of the decision problem at time t as follows:
Vit = max{u(xi,Yit − Rit,εit) + βEVit+1,Wit} (1)
where u(.) is the instant payoﬀ from consuming the home at period t. W is the value of
default which is the weighted sum of payoﬀs across the complex set of random scenarios
discussed above.
An important feature of (1) above is the presence of the continuation payoﬀ βEVit+1,
which can be understood to be the value of the option of defaulting in the future; on
the other hand, defaulting gives also rise to continuation values that depend in general
on the expected evolution of the state variables. We will consider ﬁrst a model in
which debtors are myopic in the sense that they ignore the dynamics of the state
variables. This simpliﬁcation may lead to biased estimates in certain circumstances.
For example, if the expected evolution of the state space is such that individuals may
choose to delay default decisions that appear to be optimal in a static environment,
the model will wrongly infer that the consumer has a low marginal utility of income.
It is therefore going to be a good approximation of reality in circumstances where the
state variables are stationary or where the correlation of the continuation payoﬀs and
the states is stable across equilibria.
In order to ﬁx ideas, let the static utility be additively separable on observable and
unobservable states:
u(xi,Yit − Rit,εit) = θ0 + γixi + αi(Yit − Rit) + ε0it (2)
A debtor i will choose to continue paying her dues if the utility of doing so is higher
7than the utility of default:
θ0 + γixi + αi(Yit − Rit) + ε0it + βEVit+1( ¯ Pit+1,Kit+1,Yit+1,ε0it+1,ε1it+1)
≥ Wit( ¯ Pit,Kit,Yit;ωi) + ε1it (3)
where the payoﬀ of default is assumed to be a function of the expected price ¯ Pit of
the home at time t, the balance Kit of the debt and the debtor’s income Yit. These
are variables that enter directly the payoﬀs of the individual scenarios that may arise
after a default decision, as discussed above. In consequence, the continuation payoﬀ
depends on all observed and unobserved state variables.
Let Nit = 1 be the event that debtor i does not default at time t. The individual
probability of defaulting is the probability that (3) is true. By specifying a parametric
distribution for ε we can obtain the individual choice probabilities:
Prob[Nit = 1] = Prob[θ0 + γixi + αi(Yit − Rit) + ε0it + βEVit+1(.) ≥ Wit(.) + ε1it]
= Prob[θ0 + γixi + αi(Yit − Rit) − Wit(.) + βEVit+1(.) ≥ ¯ εit] (4)
Potentially, the model above can be estimated using maximum likelihood after para-
meterizing W(.) and specifying the distribution of the error term ¯ εit = ε1it − ε0it. For
example if the errors ¯ εit are assumed to be iid draws from an extreme value distribu-
tion and are assumed to be conditionally independent from the observable states (as in




1 + eθi0+γixi+αi(Yit−Rit)−Wit(.)+βEVit+1(.) (5)
The problem of using a simple logit model as in (5) is that it assumes that all
randomness is captured by the iid extreme value errors. It rules out the existence of
4Other parametric distributions can also be adopted. For example, if ¯ ε are assumed to be standard
normal, a standard probit model ensues.
8unobserved variables that are correlated with the preferences of the individual5. In
general, it is desirable to allow the error term to have a richer pattern of correlation
across the several dimensions of the data than the simple iid errors in (5). We will
accomplish that by decomposing the error into time- and individual-speciﬁc compo-
nents that can be treated in the estimation as ﬁxed or random eﬀects, or that can be
conditioned on observed states.
Notice that the described empirical model allows the identiﬁcation of the structure
of debtors’ preferences up to its diﬀerence with the outside utility Wit. This outside
payoﬀ cannot be normalized because it presumably depends on the same variables that
aﬀect utility.
The estimation of the general model above involves two technical diﬃculties. First,
it requires the computation of the continuation payoﬀs for every debtor along the
estimation algorithm which is a nontrivial computational task with a sample that
contains literally thousands of observations. Second, it requires matching data of all
observable states at the micro level –specially it requires matching data on individual
income over time, which is something that we don’t have.
To circumvent the need to compute the dynamic problem along the estimation
algorithm, the estimation below is based on a set of structural restrictions that turn
(1) into a static problem. Otherwise, maximization of the sample likelihood function
corresponding to (5) would require the numerical computation of the continuation
payoﬀs EVit for each individual mortgage, at every point in time, throughout the
estimation algorithm.
Loosely speaking, if the relationship between the states and the continuation payoﬀs
is stable across equilibria, then the estimates of a simple logit estimation are going to
be “stable”. This stability condition would hold, for example, if the distribution of the
state variables is stationary so that the continuation payoﬀs are a constant.
5The same limitation is true for the case of the standard probit model.
9On the other hand, non-matching survey data will be incorporated into the esti-
mation by integrating the predicted individual default probabilities over the empirical
distribution of income, conditional on the observed states. Speciﬁcally, the sample
likelihood is going to be simulated from draws of income taken from survey data that
contains matching information on income and housing values. The details of the sim-
ulation method are discussed below.
4 Estimation of a model of default with Colombian
data (1997-2004)
4.1 The data
The model above is estimated with two separate non-matching panel data sets. The
ﬁrst (or “main”) data set contains information on 16000 random mortgages that were
outstanding between 1997 and 2002. The monthly payment history of each mortgage,
its original and current value and term of the mortgaged home are included. On the
other hand, the expected prices of individual homes at any point in time ¯ Pit are com-
puted using home price indices constructed by the Colombian Central Bank following
Escobar et al (2006). All data is aggregated into quarters, so that default observations
are not confounded with missed payments or coding errors.
Since this main data set contains no information on the income of debtors over
the span of the sample, survey data were collected with information on the joint dis-
tribution of households income and mortgage holdings (the “secondary” data set).
Speciﬁcally, annual surveys conducted by DANE contain large samples of individual
household incomes and matching housing payments that can be used to simulate the
joint distribution of income and the other state variables.
Table 1 contains some summary statistics of the main data set, which goes from the
10second quarter of 1997 to the second quarter of 20046. Notice that the number of loans
in the data set changes over time as loans are paid oﬀ completely or new loans start;
this number ﬂuctuates roughly between 5000 and 8000. Columns (3) and (4) of the
table contain the percentage of loans in the data at each point in time with more than
3 and 6 months of past due payments, illustrating the dramatic prevalence of default
during the crisis. After 2000 until the end of the data set, more than 20% of all loans
in the data set had past due payments of more than 3 months reaching 23% in the
second quarter of 2003. The percentage of loans with past due payments of more than
6 months reaches its peak of more than 16% in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003.
In the data it is observed that sometimes debtors temporarily stop making their
payments. Therefore what ’default’ means has to be deﬁned. Speciﬁcally in the esti-
mation below, loans that accumulate past due payments of more than 3 months are
assumed to be defaulted and are dropped oﬀ from the data set. Therefore, ’default’
is deﬁned as the event in which the number of past due payments in a loan history
changes from 3 or less to more than 3 between two quarters. After a loan is deﬁned to
be defaulted, it is dropped oﬀ the sample7.
The default rate based on this deﬁnition (i.e. the number of ’defaults’ over the
total number of outstanding loans) is displayed in column (5) of the table. This rate
reached its peak of more than 6% in the midst of the ﬁnancial crisis, during the earlier
quarters of 2000. Notice, though, that this rate is generally decreasing over the time
span of the sample, due to the fact that defaulted loans are dropped from the sample.
A dramatic reﬂection of the depth of the crisis in these years is the fact that by the
end of the sample debtors had defaulted on more than 80% of the loans included in
6Since default is inferred from the change in the number of past due mortgage payments, the ﬁrst
observation in the ﬁrst quarter of 1997 had to be dropped from the data set.
7The default rate based on this deﬁnition is highly correlated with default rates based on longer
default periods. The 3-month threshold was chosen in order to observe as much default as possible
and in order to capture all defaulted loans, including those that are terminated soon after default.
11this random according to our deﬁnition of default.
There’s no direct information on the size of the required monthly payments. It
is known though that they were directly tied to the rate of mortgage balance over
the remaining term of the loan. The balance of the loan was tied to the market
interest rate through a formula established by the Central Bank. Column (6) of Table
1 contains the average real value of the ratio of mortgage balance to remaining term
among outstanding loans. Notice that this value increases throughout the whole span
of the sample. This increase might have been partly driven by the price of new homes,
specially before 2000. Nevertheless, as can be seen in column (7) the real value of the
homes in the sample is decreasing throughout the whole time span of the sample, in
particular after 2000.
Table 2 characterizes the observed correlations contained in the data. Speciﬁcally,
a linear probability model of non-default was estimated using the deﬁnition of default
described above. Dependent variables include the mortgage balance, the expected price
of the collateral and the remaining term of the loan at each point in time. As expected,
default is positively correlated with the balance of mortgages at any point in time and
with their remaining term. It is, on the other hand, negatively correlated with the
expected price of the collateral8.
It must remembered that the whole point of this paper is to isolate the causal
eﬀects of each variable on default behavior. The contention is that the described data
sets contain suﬃcient exogenous variation so that the underlying relationships can be
uncovered. The correlations described above may be just a reﬂection of unobserved
states that are correlated with the included explanatory variables. In particular, the
variation of the unobserved income of individual debtors may be driving the results of
the regressions. The last two columns of Table 2 contain results of the model which
8Notice that the table reports the estimates of a regression of non-default on covariates, which is
consistent with the speciﬁcation of the structural model below.
12includes ﬁxed time-eﬀects that capture the component of the unobserved states that
is common to all debtors. Notice that the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the
correlations don’t change much after the inclusion of the ﬁxed eﬀects which suggests
that the unobserved component of the error that is common to all debtors is not
correlated with the observed variables included in the regression.
The estimates of the time eﬀects, which are measured with respect to the constant
in the second quarter of 1997, are mostly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of correlation of
these estimates and the average income of mortgage holders in the secondary data set
is 0.41, which is consistent with the presumption that the time eﬀects are capturing a
lot of the common variation in household income.
The literature on mortgage default (e.g. Deng et al, 2003) has documented the fact
that the initial loan to value (LTV) ratio of loans is correlated with the risk attitude
of debtors who select themselves to diﬀerent mortgage contracts. As seen on the left
hand side columns of Table 2, there is a signiﬁcant negative correlation between default
and the initial LTV ratio, controlling for current home values and mortgage balances.
As seen on the two right hand side columns of the table, this correlation becomes
tenuous and insigniﬁcant when using ﬁxed time controls. This implies that the sharp
correlation detected in the ﬁrst set of estimates is not strong within time periods. It
is suggestive, though, of the importance of heterogeneity to explain observed default
behavior.
Even though the results of these regression estimates are somewhat consistent with
the described behavioral model, they are only descriptive. Nevertheless, the signiﬁcant
correlations described above are the basis for the econometric identiﬁcation of the
structural model below.
134.2 The empirical model of default
As indicated above, the data sets contain no information on the characteristics of the
individual homes. Therefore, it will be assumed that the unobserved “quality” of homes
xi is random:




it is a random error that is potentially correlated over time and across debtors.
There is no information on the required monthly payments Rit of each debtor. It
is known, though, that payments are linear functions of mortgage balances Kit and
remaining term Lit, with some random variation across debtors:




it is an error term.
It will also be assumed that the payoﬀ of default Wit(.) is a linear function of
relevant states:




it is the structural error. Recall that this payoﬀ is a linear combination of
payoﬀs across random outcomes payoﬀs; if these payoﬀs are linear functions of states,
then the linear payoﬀ function Wit(.) should be stable across counterfactual equilibria,
as long as states don’t aﬀect the probabilities of individual outcomes. Notice that a
careful interpretation of the function Wit is important because the usefulness of the
model for counterfactual analysis relies on the assumption that this function will not
change when we change the values or the transition probabilities of the state variables.
As explained above the full estimation of the model (1) requires the computation
of the continuation payoﬀs for every debtor at every point in time along the estimation
algorithm. The estimation in this paper is going to be based on the assumption that the
expected continuation payoﬀ is a linear function of current observed states. Formally:
βE

Vit+1( ¯ Pit+1,Kit+1,Yit+1,ε0it+1,ε1it+1)| ¯ Pit,Kit,Yit,ε0it,ε1it

14= υ0 + υ1 ¯ Pit + υ2Yit + υ3Kit + ε
v
it (9)
which implies that the continuation payoﬀ can be written in terms of the observed
states is a linear function of the states, and that this linear relationship is stable.
Admittedly, this assumption is very strong. It will nevertheless enable the estimation
of the model using relatively standard techniques. Obtained results, in turn, can be
easily related to the underlying general model.
Substituting (6), (7), (8) and (9) in condition (3), the non-default condition for
debtor i at time t can be obtained:
θ0 + γ(κ + ε
x





+υ0 + υ1 ¯ Pit + υ2Yit + υ3Kit + ε
v
it ≥ ω0 + ω1Yit + ω2 ¯ Pit + ω3Kit + ε
w
it (10)
Grouping terms the condition above can be rewritten as:
ζ0 + ζ1 ¯ Pit + ζ2Yit + ζ3Kit + ζ4Lit + ¯ εit ≥ 0 (11)
Therefore the non-default probability will depend on the distribution of the error term





it. In order to allow a rich correlation across choices we
will consider models in which the error is decomposed as follows:
¯ εit = ξt + µi + it (12)
where the term µi is an individual-speciﬁc unobservable state and it is an iid idiosyn-
cratic disturbance. This speciﬁcation allows individual choices to be correlated over
time and across debtors; in addition, this unobserved heterogeneity can be allowed to
depend on other observed states such as income which would be equivalent to a model
with heterogenous ζ coeﬃcients.
Assume that  is distributed according to an extreme value distribution. Then, the
individual non-default probability (5) is given by:
Prob(Nit = 1) =
eζ0+ζ1 ¯ Pit+ζ2Yit+ζ3Kit+ζ4Lit+ξt+µi
1 + eζ0+ζ1 ¯ Pit+ζ2Yit+ζ3Kit+ζ4Lit+ξt+µi (13)
15Suppose ﬁrst that µi = ξt = 0. Again, Nit = 1 stands for the event of debtor i not
defaulting on her mortgage at time t. Estimating the parameters ζ of the model above
requires the maximization of the sample non-default likelihood predicted by the model.
This likelihood is computed by multiplying the likelihood of observed choices across







Nit(Prob(Nit = 1) − 1)
1−Nit (14)
where St is the random set of loans that is outstanding at time t.
The likelihood (14) cannot be computed directly due to the unavailability of match-
ing income data. The non-matching income data from household surveys can be in-
corporated into the estimation above by integrating the likelihood over the empirical
joint distribution of income and mortgage payments. Notice that the individual un-
observed eﬀects can also be incorporated into the estimation by assuming they come
from a pre-speciﬁed parametric distribution and integrating them out throughout the
estimation.
Speciﬁcally, if we assume that the individual eﬀects µi are distributed according to
some known parametric distribution Φ(σµ), the “expected” non default probability is:
ˆ Prob[Nit = 1] =
Z
eζ0+ζ1 ¯ Pit+ζ2Y +ζ3Kit+ζ4Lit+ξt+µ
1 + eζ0+ζ1 ¯ Pit+ζ2Y +ζ3Kit+ζ4Lit+ξt+µdGt(Y | K)dΦ(σµ) (15)
where ξ = {ξt=1...T} is treated as a vector of ﬁxed time-eﬀects that can be estimated for
each t. G(. | K) is the empirical distribution of household income at time t, conditional
on mortgage balances, which can be inferred from the survey data.
Given any set of parameters {ζ,ξ,σµ} the probabilities above can be obtained via






( ˆ Prob(Nit = 1))
Nit( ˆ Prob(Nit = 1) − 1)
1−Nit (16)
164.3 Estimation and results
To estimate the model, the simulated likelihood (16) was maximized by computing the
predicted probabilities (15) using simulation. The ﬁrst issue to be addressed is the
speciﬁcation of the unobserved debtor heterogeneity. Following the previous empirical
literature on mortgage default (e.g. Deng et al, 2003), debtor heterogeneity will be
tied to the initial “loan to value” LTVi = Ki0/Pi0 of the mortgage, where t = 0 stands
for the moment at which the loan was ﬁrst started. This speciﬁcation presumes that
debtors select themselves to mortgages with diﬀerent LTV according to their attitude
towards risk.
Accordingly, it is assumed that ¯ εit = ξt + σmuLTVi¯ µi + it, so that the unobserved
component of utility has a common element ξt that varies over time, a consumer-speciﬁc
component σmuLTViµi and an extreme value consumer- and time-speciﬁc shock it.
The consumer-speciﬁc shock σmuLTVi¯ µi is assumed to be correlated with the initial
leverage of the mortgage, so that its distribution can be separated from the distribution
of the idiosyncratic shock. Speciﬁcally, ¯ µi is assumed to be a standard normal error,
so that the consumer-speciﬁc error is normal with zero mean and variance σ2
muLTV 2
i .
Higher absolute realizations of this unobserved error are associated with a higher initial
LTV and are a consumer speciﬁc constant that shifts the individual utility function.
On the other hand, the common component of the error ξt=1,...,T was estimated as a
ﬁxed time eﬀect. Therefore, for any set of parameters {ζ,ξ,σµ}, a consistent estimator
of such integral is given by:





eζ0+ζKKit+ζP ¯ Pit+ζLLit+ζY Yj+ξt+σµ ¯ Pit¯ µi
1 + eζ0+ζKKit+ζP ¯ Pit+ζLLit+ζY Yj+ξt+σµLTVi¯ µi (17)
where µj are independent standard normal draws and Yj are income draws taken from
the empirical distribution of income, conditioned on housing payments, contained in
yearly surveys. The average is taken over J simulations.
Speciﬁcally, the survey data contains random observations of households’ income
17and mortgage payments of homeowners9, while the main data set contains information
on the balances and maturities of outstanding mortgages. It is assumed that the dis-
tribution of monthly mortgage payments is the same as the distribution of balances
over the remaining maturity of mortgages Kit/Lit. Therefore, the quantiles of the
distribution of Kit/Lit in the main data set correspond to the quantiles of the distrib-
ution of income for the households that are making mortgage payments. In computing
(11), draws of { ¯ Pit,Kit,Lit} are therefore matched with random draws of Yit from the
same conditional distribution quantile. Given that surveys with mortgage payment
data are only available at the yearly level, the distribution of income conditional on
mortgage payments is interpolated to remaining quarters, by assuming that the income
distribution was constant within years.
Four versions of the model were estimated with results reported in Table 3. In model
1 it is assumed that µ = ξ = 0; in model 2 µ = 0 and in model 3 ξ = 0. Model 4 is the
full model as in (17). The displayed results of models 1 and 3 were obtained simulating
20 income draws for each observation from the corresponding income quantile in the
secondary data set. Due to the size of the involved matrices, models 2 and 4 were
estimated from 10 income draws per observation; in addition, a random subsample of
1/4 of the simulated sample was taken to alleviate computer memory restrictions. To
give an idea of the computational magnitude of the estimation, the size of the matrix
of regressors after subsampling in model 4 was (572600x34). The reported standard
errors were obtained using the standard formula and are very robust to alternative
speciﬁcations.
Given the rich variation of the data documented above, it is not surprising that
the estimates are highly signiﬁcant. An exception is the income coeﬃcient in models
2 and 4, whose high standard errors are presumably due to the lower number of in-
9More precisely, the surveys ask whether people are ﬁnancing the home they live in and how much
do they pay.
18come draws used in its estimation. Consistently with the correlations reported above,
higher balances and longer remaining terms induce lower non-default probabilities. On
the other hand, higher expected home prices induce higher non-default probabilities.
Similarly, higher income is associated with higher non-default, which is not surprising.
Table 3 also reports the computed average marginal eﬀects of each variable on the
non-default probabilities. As can be seen, these average eﬀects are all comparable to
the reported results from the linear probability model and mostly similar. One likely
exception is the marginal eﬀect of the expected home price which is consistently higher
in the structural estimation than in the linear model, the magnitude of the diﬀerence
being both statistically and economically signiﬁcant.
Given the environment faced by debtors during the time span of the sample, the
salient feature of the results is the estimate of the income coeﬃcient. The statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient is not surprising given the sharp correlation of income
and default reported above. What is somewhat surprising is its very low economic
signiﬁcance. As indicated in the table, in average a marginal increase of COL$10
million a month in 1998 which is well above the mean of COL$0.6 million, induces
an increase in the non-default probability of 0.2%. On the other hand, an decrease in
the price of home of COL$10 million in 1998, which is less than the average loss of
housing values in the sample between 1998 and 1999, induces an increase in the default
probability of around 0.2%10. This magnitude is not insigniﬁcant, given the magnitude
of the default rates, which is between 1% and 6%.
Notice that this results are robust to speciﬁcations that control for the random
heterogeneity that might be correlated with the observable covariates. Speciﬁcally, it
might be argued that income, balances and housing prices might be correlated with
an unobservable variable that hit the default probabilities of all debtors. It is diﬃcult
ascertain what such a variable can be, but it might be the case that once default rates
10Remember that the table displays the results of the model of non-default.
19increased, debtors anticipated that renegotiating the terms of the mortgage was easier.
On the other hand, it might also be argued that the observable variables might be
correlated with unobserved individual-level heterogeneity due to endogenous selection
of debtors into speciﬁc mortgage terms.
Nevertheless, the results of the estimation are robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed time-
eﬀects in models 2 and 4 and to the inclusion in models 3 and 4 of a normal unobserved
heterogeneity that is correlated with the initial LTV and, at least indirectly, with
current realizations of Ki and Pi . As indicated above, the addition in models 3 and
4 of the normal error that is correlated with LTVi aims to capture the fact that even
conditional on the unobservables, default rates might vary across consumer types who
select themselves into homes with diﬀerent prices.
Notice that the coeﬃcient of the individual-speciﬁc error is signiﬁcant and negative,
which means that default rates of debtors are negatively correlated across initial LTV
values due to underlying heterogeneity. The estimates of the ﬁxed time-eﬀects, which
account for unobserved aggregate shocks that are not correlated with observed variables
are large. As seen in Figure 1, this time varying constant which is measure with respect
to the constant at the initial period exhibits a large correlation with the aggregate
default rates.
It has to be said that this time eﬀects are quite large. In other words, the observed
variables in the model cannot account for a big portion of the time variation of default
behavior. This is not surprising given that most of the variation on which the identiﬁ-
cation of the model is based is cross sectional and dynamic eﬀects have been ignored.
The results are nevertheless reassuring of the econometric validity of the obtained esti-
mates, in the sense that the the observed states variables don’t appear to be correlated
with the unobservables.
The results above strongly suggest that, conditional on the speciﬁed behavioral
model, household income variation was not the driving force behind the dramatic
20increases in mortgage defaults during the late 1990’s. The variation in the price of
the collateral and the increases in the size of the mortgage balances seemed to have
played a more important role. In the following section a more precise evaluation of
these impacts is performed. The role of other unobserved factors is also discussed.
4.4 Fit of the model and additional results
As seen in ﬁgure 1, the model can trace satisfactorily the aggregate default rates. Ag-
gregated over time, the default rate reached 86%, which is a dramatic ﬁgure; it means
that 86% of the household in this random sample accumulated past due mortgage pay-
ments for more than 3 months11. The diﬀerence between this observed overall default
rate and the rate predicted by the model is of less than 0.5%. As indicated above,
though, much of the time variation of default behavior is driven by an unobserved
aggregate shock, equivalent to a time-changing model constant (more on this below).
In this sense, the model is better suited to understand the variation in default across
debtors at any point in time.
In order to isolate more clearly the impact of individual factors on default prob-
abilities, the model can be used to compute them directly. Table 4 contains default
probabilities for an “average” debtor with diﬀerent values of the observed states, keep-
ing the other values at the average value they had at the beginning of the sample12.
The probabilities are computed for values of L, P and K that lie at the center of the
quintile of their distribution.
Notice that predicted default probabilities for this “average” debtor are very sen-
11If instead of deﬁning default as the accumulation of 3 or more months of past due payments we
had used a threshold of 6 months, the accumulated default rate over the time span of the sample
would have been 49%, which is still a staggering ﬁgure.
12Speciﬁcally, default probabilities were computed for ¯ K = 1.614, ¯ P = 4.493, ¯ L = 42 and ¯ Y = 0.0865
which were the average values of these states in the 3rd quarter of 1997; recall that K, P and Y are
measured in tens of millions of constant 1997 Colombian pesos.
21sitive to changes in the observed states. For example, at any point in time increasing
the number of remaining periods of mortgage maturity, L, from the center of the lower
quintile of the distribution of L (L = 27) to the center of the upper quintile of the
distribution of L (L = 57) increases the predicted default probability by around 50%.
Keeping everything else constant, increasing the balance of the mortgage K from the
center of the lower quintile (K = 0.36)to the center of the upper quintile of its distri-
bution (K = 3.8) increases the predicted default probabilities at any point in time by
more than 60%. The eﬀect of price is just as signiﬁcant: increasing the price from the
lower quintile (P = 1.3) to the upper quintile (P = 10.8) of its distribution increases
the predicted default probability by more than 50%.
The model also allows the characterization of default probabilities across individuals
according to their unobserved income. This is important, because income is the most
important individual random state that aﬀects default behavior and that is not directly
observed by banks or policy makers. Figure 6 illustrates the percent diﬀerence in
the default rates between debtors in the upper 20% and lower 20% of the income
distribution at each point in time. For comparison purposes, ﬁgure 7 also displays the
percent diﬀerence in the default rates of households with home prices in the upper and
lower 20% distribution of home prices at each point in time. Figure 7 also also display
the percent diﬀerence in default rates between loans with remaining maturities in the
upper and lower tails of the distribution of mortgage age.
In ﬁgure 6 it can be seen that, perhaps surprisingly, the predicted default rates of
wealthier households are consistently higher than the predicted default rates of poorer
households, despite the fact that income has a negative eﬀect on the probability of
default. This diﬀerence is almost 15% at the beginning of the sample period and tends
to disappear over time as the pool of debtors shrinks. In fact, the predicted aggregate
rate of default is 90% for debtors in the upper tail of the income distribution and 84%
for debtors in the lower tail. For debtors located around the median of the distribution
22this rate was 86%.
This eﬀect is not an artifact of the wealthier households having more expensive
homes, which itself induces higher default rates; as seen in ﬁgure 7, the diﬀerence
between the average predicted default rates of households in the upper and lower tails
of the distribution of housing prices is around zero at the beginning of the sample
period and negative in the latter periods, which means that, if anything, default rates
were higher for debtors with relatively low-priced collateral. In fact, the accumulated
default rate is 81% for homes in the lower tail of the price distribution, whereas it is
86% in the upper tail. For debtors located around the median this aggregate default
rate was 88%.
In ﬁgure 7 it can be seen that default rates are consistently higher for loans with
longer remaining maturities. This is of course a direct implication of the fact that
it is easier to default on young mortgages that have small accumulated equity. But
then the positive correlation of income and default has to be a result of an underlying
concentration of mortgages with long remaining maturities in the hands of relatively
wealthier households. This, in turn, is a reﬂection of the credit boom that preceded
the time span of the sample.
This section ﬁnishes with a discussion about the variation over time of the pre-
dicted default probabilities. As indicated above, the model is not very well suited for
predicting the variation of default probabilities over time, as much of it is explained
by an unobserved aggregate shock which was estimated taking advantage of the panel
structure of the data. The estimation results implied that this “error” is not correlated
with the observed states. It is diﬃcult to argue that these shocks are random, but it
is also diﬃcult to infer from the data what drives their evolution.
The model doesn’t explicitly include aggregate variables, because it would be dif-
ﬁcult to establish any meaningful causal connection to the observed default behavior.
For example, ﬁgure 8 displays the ﬁxed time-eﬀects estimated in Models 2 and 4 and
23the average 90-days deposit interest rate, which is regarded as a good measure of the
opportunity cost of liquid assets in Colombia. As can be seen, the time-eﬀects and the
interest rate seem to be somewhat negatively correlated: their correlation coeﬃcient is
around -0.1. Inferring a causal relationship from this correlation is not possible, due to
the fact that the interest rate is presumably correlated with other unobserved aggre-
gate variables that drive the variation of default over time. Notice, though, that the
estimated time-eﬀects isolate the eﬀects of aggregate variables on default. Therefore,
they can be used to construct a statistical model relating aggregate shocks to default,
which is beyond the scope of this study.
4.5 Summary of the estimation algorithm
The estimation of the model above is based on the computation of the simulated
likelihood of the sample across observations:
• Organize the income data from highest to lowest housing payments using the sur-
veys that contain both. Separate observations into quantiles; this joint distribu-
tion of income and housing payments is assumed to be equivalent to the joint dis-
tribution of income and Kit/Lit. Organize the observations of { ¯ Pit,Kit,Lit,LTVi}
from highest to lowest Kit/Lit and separate it into quantiles.
• For each loan in the sample generate a number J of standard normal draws εi that
are constant over time. Match these draws with J random draws with replace-
ment from the corresponding quantile of the distribution of Yjt, conditional on
the mortgage payments. Keep these draws constant throughout the estimation.
• Set the vector of parameters {ζ0,σµ0}. Compute ˆ L0 using (16) and (17) using
the “simulated” sample described above.
• Look numerically for the set of parameters {ζ∗,σ∗
µ} that maximize the likelihood
24of the sample. Compute the standard errors of the estimates using the usual
methods.
5 Concluding remarks and further research
This paper has developed an empirical model of mortgage default, whose estimates can
be related to an underlying behavioral model. Methodologically, the paper illustrated
the kind of assumptions needed to obtain a model that can be estimated using variations
of a simple logit model. Still, the model improved upon the standard logit/probit
framework in two ways: First, the model is estimated using non-matching panels of
income and mortgage payment data. Second, the model allows for the presence of
persistent heterogeneity across consumers.
The resulting technique is similar to a standard discrete choice model, except that
the non-matching income data and the unobserved heterogeneity are incorporated into
the model using simulation techniques. The main result of the paper is that income
variation had a very small eﬀect on the default probabilities, compared with the eﬀect
of housing prices and mortgage balances (which were tied to a market interest rate),
which is consistent with a model of rational default behavior.
It is also found persistent debtor heterogeneity is found to be statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, it is found that at any point in time and given the joint distribution of states,
default rates were higher for higher income households. The estimation also allows the
estimation of an aggregate time-varying common shock that seems to be the driving
force of the variation of default over time.
This paper leaves two open avenues for continuing research. First, the estimated
aggregate shock can be used to construct a model that ties it to the evolution of
the macroeconomic environment. Second, the estimation of the model relied on a
simpliﬁed treatment of dynamics. Due to the size of the sample, estimating a fully
25dynamic model is complicated. It would require the computation of consumer-speciﬁc
continuation payoﬀs along the estimation algorithm, which is computationally diﬃcult.
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26Table 1: Summary statistics (main data set)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quarter Number Past due Past due Default Balance/ Average
of loans 3 months 6 months rate term price
1997 : 2 4965 6.4 % 1.6 % 4.0 % 370770 72482000
1997 : 3 4958 7.1 % 1.8 % 3.2 % 387160 73308000
1997 : 4 5101 8.1 % 2.4 % 3.0 % 399720 75518000
1998 : 1 7197 8.2 % 2.8 % 3.4 % 435920 64634000
1998 : 2 7365 7.9 % 3.1 % 2.3 % 447770 61548000
1998 : 3 7502 8.8 % 3.8 % 1.9 % 469250 58331000
1998 : 4 7569 10.6 % 4.6 % 2.8 % 493660 56400000
1999 : 1 7482 14.1 % 6.3 % 4.1 % 523170 57867000
1999 : 2 7809 16.3 % 7.8 % 4.7 % 504910 53608000
1999 : 3 8060 11.8 % 6.3 % 3.7 % 483630 47878000
1999 : 4 7827 19.0 % 8.3 % 6.3 % 495370 50559000
2000 : 1 8594 18.1 % 10.6 % 6.4 % 503100 47984000
2000 : 2 8020 16.1 % 9.3 % 5.3 % 478060 49014000
2000 : 3 7505 19.0 % 9.0 % 5.5 % 479880 48540000
2000 : 4 7053 19.5 % 10.6 % 3.5 % 481980 46981000
Continues in next page
Prices and balances are in 1997 COL$
27Table 1, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2001 : 1 6786 20.4 % 12.1 % 2.6 % 488410 46750000
2001 : 2 6601 22.1 % 13.8 % 2.7 % 512340 38483000
2001 : 3 6416 22.9 % 14.7 % 2.6 % 520730 40771000
2001 : 4 6253 22.8 % 15.1 % 2.2 % 525090 36298000
2002 : 1 6140 22.2 % 15.3 % 1.8 % 528920 32062000
2002 : 2 6060 22.0 % 15.6 % 1.6 % 541360 34959000
2002 : 3 6028 23.4 % 16.5 % 2.5 % 553380 33041000
2002 : 4 5891 22.6 % 15.9 % 1.7 % 554660 36579000
2003 : 1 5862 23.0 % 16.6 % 1.6 % 563210 32067000
2003 : 2 5816 23.2 % 16.4 % 1.8 % 581450 32043000
2003 : 3 5580 22.6 % 16.4 % 1.3 % 584720 31138000
2003 : 4 5666 23.3 % 16.9 % 1.8 % 576500 31256000
2004 : 1 5553 22.7 % 16.8 % 1.2 % 571580 29534000
2004 : 2 5450 22.0 % 16.4 % 1.0 % 582490 31386000
Prices and balances are in 1997 COL$
28Table 2: Linear Probability Regressions
Variable Est. t-stat Est t-stat
Constant 0.0239 14.8909 0.0271 7.8372
Balance 0.0059 12.1878 0.0053 10.7226
Price -0.0016 -10.0016 -0.0013 -8.3808
Term 0.0004 10.8136 0.0003 5.6982
LTV -0.0075 -3.2854 -0.0029 -1.2497
Time-eﬀects
1997 : 3 -0.0089 -2.1328
1997 : 4 -0.0037 -2.5864
1998 : 1 -0.0142 -1.1562
1998 : 2 -0.0182 -4.4177
1998 : 3 -0.0097 -5.6867
1998 : 4 0.0044 -3.0346
1999 : 1 0.0109 1.3566
1999 : 2 0.0011 3.3789
1999 : 3 0.0271 0.3345
1999 : 4 0.0293 8.3613
Continues in next page
29Time-eﬀects, continued
2000 : 1 0.0197 9.1465
2000 : 2 0.0216 6.0505
2000 : 3 0.0028 6.5592
2000 : 4 -0.0061 0.8397
2001 : 1 -0.0051 -1.8137
2001 : 2 -0.0058 -1.4952
2001 : 3 -0.0091 -1.6932
2001 : 4 -0.013 -2.6326
2002 : 1 -0.0151 -3.7193
2002 : 2 -0.0057 -4.3098
2002 : 3 -0.0134 -1.6115
2002 : 4 -0.0151 -3.8027
2003 : 1 -0.0125 -4.254
2003 : 2 -0.018 -3.5268
2003 : 3 -0.0123 -5.0115
2003 : 4 -0.0185 -3.4212
2004 : 1 -0.0196 -5.1382
2004 : 2 0.0194 -5.4116
30Table 3: Structural Estimation Results
Model 1 Marginal Model 2 Marginal
Coeﬃcient eﬀects eﬀects
Constant 3.7933 ( 0.0081 ) 0.1144 3.6990 ( 0.0630 ) 0.1079
Balance -0.1776 ( 0.0031 ) -0.0054 -0.1693 ( 0.0089 ) -0.0049
Price 0.0589 ( 0.0013 ) 0.0018 0.0492 ( 0.0037 ) 0.0014
Term -0.0128 ( 0.0003 ) -0.0004 -0.0127 ( 0.0010 ) -0.0004
Income 0.0847 ( 0.0252 ) 0.0026 0.0859 ( 0.0723 ) 0.0025
σµ 0 0
Model 3 Marginal Model 4 Marginal
Coeﬃcient eﬀects eﬀects
Constant 3.7911 ( 0.0081 ) 0.1144 3.0973 ( 0.0569 ) 0.1011
Balance -0.1738 ( 0.0031 ) -0.0052 -0.1038 ( 0.0091 ) -0.0034
Price 0.0579 ( 0.0013 ) 0.0017 0.0645 ( 0.0034 ) 0.0021
Term -0.0129 ( 0.0003 ) -0.0004 -0.0007 ( 0.0009 ) -0.00002
Income 0.0825 ( 0.0251 ) 0.0025 0.0453 ( 0.0631 ) 0.0015
σµ -0.0169 ( 0.0051 ) -0.264 ( 0.0128 )
Models 2 and 4 contain time-eﬀects (not shown).
31Table 4: Predicted Default Probabilities (selected quarters; evaluated at mean values
as of 1997:3)
Variable 1997:3 1998:3 1999:3 2000:3 2001:3 2002:3 2003:3
L
27 0.0435 0.0331 0.0665 0.0586 0.0106 0.0023 0.0121
40 0.0504 0.0384 0.0769 0.0678 0.0123 0.0026 0.0141
45 0.0533 0.0407 0.0812 0.0717 0.0131 0.0028 0.0149
51 0.0571 0.0436 0.0868 0.0766 0.0140 0.0030 0.0160
57 0.0611 0.0467 0.0926 0.0818 0.0151 0.0032 0.0172
K
0.3644 0.0439 0.0305 0.0588 0.0509 0.0089 0.0019 0.0099
0.7956 0.0468 0.0325 0.0626 0.0542 0.0095 0.0020 0.0106
1.1973 0.0496 0.0344 0.0663 0.0574 0.0101 0.0021 0.0112
1.7831 0.0539 0.0375 0.0720 0.0624 0.0110 0.0023 0.0122
3.8742 0.0727 0.0509 0.0964 0.0838 0.0151 0.0032 0.0168
P
1.3044 0.0639 0.0433 0.0778 0.0652 0.0111 0.0023 0.0121
2.1439 0.0607 0.0411 0.0740 0.0620 0.0105 0.0022 0.0114
3.1892 0.0570 0.0385 0.0694 0.0581 0.0098 0.0021 0.0107
4.9138 0.0512 0.0346 0.0625 0.0523 0.0088 0.0019 0.0096
10.8746 0.0353 0.0237 0.0432 0.0360 0.0060 0.0013 0.0065
The probabilities were evaluated at ¯ K = 1.614, ¯ P = 4.493, ¯ L = 42 and ¯ Y = 0.0865; prices, balances and income are
measured in tens of millions of Colombian pesos.






















Figure 2: Annualized overnight interest rate (1996−2003)









Figure 3: Home price index (1996−2003)












Figure 4: Exchange rate COL$/US$ (1996−2003)












Figure 5: Observed and predicted default (Model 4)
Predicted












Figure 6: Percent differences in default rates across income levels












Figure 7: Differences in default rates 
across house prices and mortgage maturities
(top 20% minus bottom 20%)











Figure 8: Real interest rate and fixed time effects (from model 4)
Fixed
effects
Interest
rate